At Crypto '89 Ivan Damgård [1] presented a method that allows one to construct a computationally collision free hash function that has provably the same level of security as the computationally collision free function with input of constant length that it is based upon. He also gave three examples of collision free functions to use in this construction. For two of these examples collisions have been found [2] [3], and the third one is attacked in this paper. Furthermore it is argued that his construction and proof, in spite of their theoretical importance, encourage inefficient designs in the case of practical hash functions. A framework is presented for the direct design of collision free hash functions. Finally a concrete proposal is presented named Cellhash.
Introduction
A collision free hash function h is an easily computable function that maps strings of arbitrary length to strings of some fixed length in such a way that finding two strings x and x , with h(x) = h(x ) is computationally infeasible. The pair x, x is called a collision for h. A collision free function f from m bits to t bits with m > t is an easily computable function that maps strings of length m to strings of length t, in such a way that finding a pair of strings x, x of length m, with f (x) = f (x ) is computationally infeasible.
The presence of the term 'computationally infeasible' makes the previous definitions somewhat fuzzy. By interpreting this term in different ways, we get different definitions of collision free functions or collision free hash functions. At one end of the spectrum there is the pragmatic point of view and at the other the complexity theoretic framework. For readability a collision free hash function will be denoted by 'hash function' and a collision free function with an output shorter than its input by 'CF function' in the sequel. A function that takes an input of fixed length to an output of fixed length that is shorter than the input will be denoted by 'FI function'. A CF function is a special case of a FI function.
In [1] a construction is given where finding a collision for the hash function yields a collision for the underlying CF function. Hence the hash function is provably as secure as the CF function. This reduces the design to that of the CF function. It is widely believed that this is much easier. In our opinion the direct design of a hash function is not harder and leads to more efficient, i.e. faster hash functions.
With the breaking of the Damgård function based on cellular automata in the following section, all three CF functions proposed in [1] are broken. This does not necessarily mean that collisions have been found for the corresponding hash functions built on these CF functions. However, because the underlying FI functions are shown not to be computationally collision free, the proof of Damgård does not apply. The hash functions are robbed of their provable collision free-ness. For the hash function based on cellular automata we show that the probability of the hash value being unaffected by the complementation of certain messagebits is large. Hence collisions for the hash function can be created ad libitum.
We give a general framework that allows the direct design of hash functions. Finally a concrete proposal for a hardware oriented high speed hash function is described. It is named Cellhash and its design follows this framework. Like Damgård's CF function it makes use of cellular automata, but this time in a well-considered way.
Cryptanalysis of Damgård's CF Function
Damgård's CF function g c () computes a 128-bit string h starting from a 256-bit string x. We have h = g c (x). In the following we will explain in an informal way how it operates and how to create collisions. The function is based on a cellular automaton thoroughly investigated by Wolfram in [4] . When using results of Wolfram the reader is referred to [4] for a proof or further explanation.
A constant 256-bit string z is appended to x resulting in a 512-bit string. This is taken to be the initial state a 
where a t i denotes the i-th bit of the state of the CA after t iterations. The cellular automaton performs 384 iterations and the output h consists of the concatenation of the first bits of the strings a Figure 1 .a the borders of the dependence area of the last bit of h are indicated. The left border is line with slope +1 and the right border is r 1 with slope −1. This comprises the dependence areas of all other bits of h that are mere translations upwards of the indicated area. Hence the indicated area can be seen as the dependence area of all h and will be denoted by H.
However, the updating rule is asymmetric, and so is the propagation of information [4] . It turns out that for almost all initial states a 0 , H is bounded at the right by a border that is much steeper than r 1 . In Figure 1 .a the actual border is approximated by a diagonal r 2 with slope −3 such that all of a 0 lies in H. Of course we can't just choose this slope. In reality it is fixed by the initial state a 0 . For most a 0 however r 2 can be fairly well approximated by a straight line with slope −4, hence we've been rather pessimistic. This implies that for these states some bits of a 0 lie outside of H, providing a first type of collisions. For most inputs the output is independent of the bits a contains a substring that exhibits the alternating pattern (010101. . . ), a remarkable observation can be made. As can be seen in Figure 1 .c the left edge of the pattern shifts one bit the right each timestep and the right edge follows an irregular path that moves on the average one bit to the right per three iterations [4] . This pattern is stable with respect to the updating rule, in that it expands, albeit slowly, to the right. With respect to information propagation, this pattern acts as a buffer, as can be seen in Figure 1 .d. Here the bitwise XOR of Figure 1 .c with another space-time diagram is shown. The initial state of the second space-time diagram differs only from that in Figure 1 .c in the 64 bits on the right from the alternating pattern.
It can be seen that the differences in the subsequent states propagate in the cone bounded at the left by the alternating area. This can be used to construct collisions as illustrated in Figure 1 .b. The description in [1] does not specify the constant z. However our attack works independently of the particular value of z. x is the concatenation of x s (64 bits), x v (62 bits) and x c (130 bits). inputs with the same output h. Finding these sets requires no computations whatsoever.
Collisions for the Hash Function Itself
The input to the hash function is a message m that has been padded in a one-to-one way to a multiple of 128 bits. Suppose m = m 0 m 1 . . . m n , with every m i a 128 bit string. The hash value h is the result of applying the hash function h c () to m. We have h = h c (m). This function is defined in terms of the CF function g c .
is equal to IV , a fixed initial value that is part of the specification of h c (). The hashvalue h is given by h and m i+1 . In figure  2 .b it can be seen that, for small k there is a large probability that h i+2 will be independent of the k bits of h i+1 that were affected. From this it can be concluded that changes in bits that are situated at the beginning of the blocks m i have a fair probability not to influence the hash value h.
Provably secure hashing vs. hashing in practice
Suppose g() is a CF function for which it can be proven that finding a collision is equivalent to solving a hard problem. With Damgård's method a hash function h() can now be constructed based on g(). Finding a collision for h() is equivalent to solving the hard problem. However it cannot be proven that a certain problem is hard, i.e. that there is no efficient (e.g. polynomial) algorithm to solve it. Hence the security of h() ultimately depends on the unproven assumption of the hardness of the problem. If the assumption is widely accepted, the hash function is widely considered to be secure. Complexity theory provides a fundament to a variety of widespread assumptions. Furthermore, there is emerging a vast literature treating hash functions in a complexity theoretic setting.
In practice, very fast hash functions are required. However, CF functions that are based on some widespread complexity assumption require a lot of calculation and are generally slow. Hence for the sake of speed practical hash function have been proposed that are based on functions for which finding collisions seems hard. These functions often incorporate elements that remind of hard problems. Damgård's [1] three CF functions are of this type. They are 'based' respectively on modular squaring, knapsack and cellular automata. The inventors of this type of functions assume that the use of the calculations that are related to some hard problem will provide the needed security. The fact that most of these functions have been broken, suggests that this is not a sound argument. A more rational approach is the construction of a hash function using a FI function that is designed to be collision free. If the correct construction is used the Damgård proof applies. Observe that the hash function is not computationally collision free, but that finding a collision for the hash function is at least as hard as finding a collision for the underlying FI function. The distinction between these functions and the ones described in the previous paragraph lies in the design of the presumed CF functions. The ones meant in this paragraph are those designed using sound principles of diffusion and confusion. The ones in the previous paragraph are not really designed but merely 'based' on hard problems.
Another class of hash functions makes use of an FI function that is not especially designed to be collision free. The security of the hash function is based on the fact that collisions for the FI function are of no use in the construction of a collision for the hash function. Damgård's proof does not apply in this case.
The last two classes comprise most of the practical hash function designs. There are numerous designs where the FI function is realized by a block cipher. Because a block cipher is designed for another purpose, a dedicated function is likely to provide a more efficient solution. Two recent examples of dedicated hash functions are Snefru [6] and MD4 [7] . The design of the underlying functions is based on considerations of diffusion and confusion.
To our knowledge all proposed hash functions can be described by the following general scheme:
• Segmentation: The input is padded in a prescribed way and subdivided in a number of blocks of equal length.
• Initialization: The initial value of the intermediate hash result is fixed by the specification.
• Iteration: For all blocks: the FI is applied to block i and the intermediate hash result. the output is the new intermediate hash result. Observe that each block is used only once.
• Result: The hash result is the output of the last iteration. Eventually a specified compression may take place, e.g. not all bits may be used.
In the following section we will present a framework that is even more general. It allows the design of hash functions that don't have certain restrictions imposed by this description. Because all proposed hash functions can be modeled to fit in our framework, it can also be considered as an alternative viewpoint. The framework is partly inspired by the design of MD4 [7] .
A Framework for the Direct Design of Hash Functions
The security of the hash function should be guaranteed by the diffusion and confusion of the messagebits in a hash result. In our framework this is realized in a way similar to the diffusion and confusion of the key in a symmetric block cipher, e.g. DES.
The security of the overall scheme is based on executing a number of rounds each performing easily implementable functions. This is exactly what happens in the FI function in MD4. It is however different in that the number of rounds in our framework is not constant but depends on the length of the input, i.e. the message.
In practical designs the number of rounds will be proportional to the length of the message, with a lower bound for short messages. The scheme of the framework is given in Figure 2 . It can be seen as an 'encryption' of the initial value IV that is a constant for a particular scheme. The number of rounds is k(n). Each round consists of the application of a function f j,n on the intermediate hash result
. Each f j,n is 'keyed' by a string m j , consisting of messagebits specified by a selection window s j,n . The output after k(n) rounds is the hash result. A concrete design has to define the padding, the function k(n), the functions f j,n and the selection windows s j,n for all n and 1 ≤ j < k(n).
In using this framework to design a hash function, a number of problems arise because of the variability of the number of rounds. It is for instance not clear how to devise a general selection schedule s for a variable length input. This problem can be tackled by subdividing the (possibly padded) message M in a number of equal blocks and designing the scheme for one such block. This comes down to designing an IF function that inputs one block and the intermediate hash result. This is what happens in all proposed hash functions thus far. This is however not the solution, but just one of the many. Instead of being a design principle, this blocking is a design option. When blocking is applied and the designer wants to apply the Damgård proof, he has to construct the FI functions to be collision free. This restricts these FI functions in an unnecessary way. Seen within our framework, the advantage of having a FI function that is designed to be collision free is no longer self evident. What is relevant here is the contribution of the FI function to the purpose of the hash function related to its 'computational cost', i.e. its effectiveness and efficiency.
A global approach can lead to more elegant solutions and a better use of the available computing resources, both in a hardware as in software oriented designs. Although we believe that the Damgård proof is of no value here, it keeps on being a valuable and necessary step in the construction of computationally collision free hash functions based on CF functions for which finding a collision is equivalent to solving some (generally assumed) hard problem. It is impossible to give a complete list of design criteria for hash functions in our framework. However, in the rest of this section we will informally describe some general criteria for the components of the scheme. This will be illustrated by the design of our concrete proposal Cellhash. A more theoretical treatment is in preparation.
• Size: To prevent a birthday attack the hash result has to be at least 128 bits.
• Diffusion: The functions f j,n have to guarantee diffusion of information. With equal keys, two inputs H
that differ in only a few bits must give rise to two outputs H j andH j differing in substantially more bits even in worst case. If the f j,n are invertible for a fixed key m j it is guaranteed that no two inputs give the same output. The key-dependence of the functions has to maximize the diffusion of the messagebits into the hash result. Therefore it is required that each f j,n , with the input fixed and seen as a function from key to output, is an injection for all possible inputs.
• Confusion: The hash result has to depend on the messagebits in an involved and complicated way. Therefore it is necessary that the f j,n provide the indispensable nonlinearity (in relation to all thinkable algebras). To promote confusion the selection schedule has to use each and every messagebit several times. Preferably a messagebit would be selected in a number of rounds that are mutually distant in time. The rounds that precede and succeed these would preferably use as many different messagebits as possible.
• Feasibility: The goal is a hash function actually working at high speed . A succinct and clear description is an advantage both in software, leading to a short program, and in hardware, possibly leading to a simple and compact device. Moreover, a long or complicated description enlarges the probability of implementation errors.
-Software: Specific widespread instructions of processors can be advantageously used in the f j,n . Restrictions on the selection schedule are imposed by the relatively slow memory access in contrast to the access of on-chip registers or cache. -Hardware: For speed, the implementation should be on one chip, with the traffic onto and off the chip minimized. The f j,n must be decomposable in a limited number of primitives, which are actually implemented. By parallel computation optimal use can be made of available storage and time.
6 Cellhash: A Hardware oriented Hash Function
Cellhash is a hash function capable of very high speeds if implemented in hardware.
In applications where speed is important and very large amounts of data have to be authenticated (e.g. electronic financial transactions, software integrity) hardware implementations are the natural solution. The core of Cellhash is formed by two cellular automata operations and a permutation. These guarantee the confusion and diffusion properties and allow for an efficient one chip hardware implementation by well established methods [11] . By adoption of Cellhash (or a similar algorithm) as a standard, costs would be reduced even further because of the high quantities of chips produced. This low cost opens up the possibility of the installation of these IC's in a standard way on computers.
The Global Scheme
The hash result of a message M of length n is computed in two phases :
• Preparation of the message The message is extended with the minimum number of 0's so that its length in bits is at least 248 and congruent to 24 modulo 32. The number of bits added is represented in a byte that is subsequently appended, most significant bit first. At this point the resulting message has a length that is an exact multiple of 32 bits. The resulting message can be written as M 0 M 1 . . . M N −1 , i.e. the concatenation of N (32-bit) words M i .
• Application of the hash function F c (H, A) is a function with argument H a bitstring of length 257 and A a bitstring of length 256. It returns a bitstring of length 257. IV is the all-zero bitstring of length 257.
Hence the number of rounds k(n) = max(8, reaching the end of the message the first 224 bits can be seen as repeated (e.g. if
. In this way every bit of the message is used exactly 8 times in the hashing process.
Description of F c (H, A)
The computation can be considered as a 5-step transformation of H. The calculations in each step are done simultaneously on all bits of H. Let h 0 h 1 . . . h 256 denote the bits of H and a 0 a 1 . . . a 255 the bits of A. All indices should be taken modulo 257, ∨ means OR and ⊕ means XOR.
Step 1 :
Step 2 :
h 0 =h 0 Step 3 :
Step 4 :
Step 5 :
The five steps are further clarified in Figure 3 .
Step 1 is a nonlinear cellular automaton (CA) operation where each bitvalue h i is updated according to the bitvalues in its neighborhood (in this step and step 3 periodic boundary conditions apply). The nonlinearity of the updating rule has to guarantee the needed confusion. This particular CA operation is invertible if the length of H is odd [9] .
Step 2 consists merely of complementing 1 bit to eliminate circular symmetry in case bitstring A consists of only 0's.
Step 3 is a linear CA operation that greatly increases the diffusion. This step is invertible if the length of H is no multiple of 9 [9] . In step 4 the actual messagebits are injected in H, to be diffused and confused during subsequent rounds.
Step 5 is a bit permutation where bits are placed away from their previous neighbors. This step is needed to maintain a permanent diffusion during the hashing process. The length of H is 257 (a prime) to make step 1 and 3 invertible and to avoid circular symmetric patterns in H.
Properties

• Size
The hash result is 257 bits long. If it is more convenient to use only 256 bits of the hash result, its first or last bit can easily be omitted without jeopardizing the security significantly.
• Diffusion Each bit of H small probability, only a few rounds later. Moreover every bit of the message is selected 8 times in the hashing process. Because of the diffusion mechanism in F c described above, the influence of the first injection of a messagebit has already spread out over all bits of the intermediate hash result by the time of the last injection.
• Hardware Feasibility The description allows a straightforward chip implementation [11] . One round comprises one F c calculation and the parallel input of 32 new messagebits and can be performed in one clockcycle. The total hashing process takes one round per 32 bits and 8 supplementary initial rounds for the installation of the first 256 messagebits. A very conservative guess of about 10 Mhz clockfrequency [11] gives a hashing speed of 0.3 Gbit/sec. for long messages.
• Provable Security ?
The designers of Cellhash do not claim that finding a collision for Cellhash is equivalent to any hard problem other than finding a collision for Cellhash.
Conclusions
Collisions have been found for Damgård's CF function based on cellular automata. A general framework is presented that allows the direct design of hash functions. A concrete proposal is described named Cellhash. Unlike Snefru and MD4, Cellhash is designed for hardware implementation, making extremely high speed possible.
